Abstract. After a brief survey of iterative algorithms for general stochastic games, we concentrate on finite-step algorithms for two special classes of stochastic games. They are Single-Controller Stochastic Games and Perfect Information Stochastic Games. In the case of single-controller games, the transition probabilities depend on the actions of the same player in all states. In perfect information stochastic games, one of the players has exactly one action in each state. Single-controller zero-sum games are efficiently solved by linear programming. Non-zero-sum single-controller stochastic games are reducible to linear complementary problems (LCP). In the discounted case they can be modified to fit into the so-called LCPs of Eave's class L. In the undiscounted case the LCP's are reducible to Lemke's copositive plus class. In either case Lemke's algorithm can be used to find a Nash equilibrium. In the case of discounted zero-sum perfect information stochastic games, a policy improvement algorithm is presented. Many other classes of stochastic games with orderfield property still await efficient finite-step algorithms.
Introduction
From the point of view of modelling real-life applications of discrete dynamic games as stochastic games, the key issue is, having modelled practical problems as stochastic games, how would one solve for equilibrium payoffs and strategies for such stochastic games? What are some efficient algorithms for stochastic games that can be solved in finite arithmetic steps? Here we report some recent progress in this direction.
Zero-Sum Two-Person Stochastic Games with Discounted Payoff
Imagine two players playing one of possibly different matrix games at each stage, and the game at each stage depends on the previous game and the entry selected by the players. Games with just such conceptual structure are called stochastic games. They were introduced in a seminal paper by Shapley [44] . Let A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A N be real matrices known to the two players. By state s we mean the matrix game A s . Players start in, say, state s. They play the matrix game A s . Immediately thereafter, player I receives the payoff from player II and the game moves to A k with probability q(k|s, i s , j s ) which depends on the choices i s , j s by players I and II in state s. At the next stage they play A k , and so on. The transition probabilities known to both players are assumed to be Markovian in the sense that the probability of the next game is determined only by the immediate past and not by the entire history. The aim of player I is to get as much as possible. The aim of player II is to lose as little as possible. Of course, a repeated matrix game is a very special case of this game where A 1 = A 2 = . . . = A N . Since the game never ends it is not clear what is meant by maximizing the payoff. We shall emphasize two particular payoff criteria that are commonly considered in the literature.
In the discounted payoff, with 0 ≤ β < 1, one takes as payoff
where r(s n , i n , j n ) = a (sn) i n j n = payoff on the n-th time point, where the matrix game A s n is played, and row i n and column j n are chosen there. Under the above criterion, the current rewards are more important than the future prospects.
In the undiscounted payoff, or the limiting average payoff, also called the Cesaro average payoff, one takes as payoff lim inf
While one may envisage the possibility of developing complex strategies based on all the accumulated history at each time point, in his fundamental paper [44] Shapley showed that β-discounted stochastic games 1 can be played optimally using stationary strategies. A stationary strategy is one where the players play in a "memoryless" way in the following sense: for each matrix game A s , player I (player II) selects a fixed probability distribution on the rows (columns) of A s and no matter how the matrix A s is reached, the rows (or columns) are chosen according to the fixed probability distribution. Finally, an even simpler strategy is to select for each matrix game A s a particular row (or column) to be played whenever state s is reached. These are called pure stationary strategies, and will be seen to be adequate for some very special classes of stochastic games [43] .
Iterative Algorithms for Discounted Zero-Sum Games
In his fundamental paper [44] , Shapley showed that player I, by using an optimal stationary strategy f 0 , can guarantee the expected discounted payoff of v (s) , no matter what strategy the opponent adopts. Similarly for an optimal stationary g 0 , the expected discounted payoff φ β (f, g 0 )(s) is at most v(s) against all strategies f of player I.
Shapley's proof contained an algorithm to compute approximately the value and optimal stationary strategies. This can be illustrated for the following stochastic game with two states and discount factor β = .5.
Here, in state s = 1, when players choose row 1 and column 1 or row 2 and column 2, the play remains in the same state. Otherwise it moves to state 2, where the play is permanently absorbed. Imagine God separately promising players I (II) to play for his/her side after their first choice. In state 2, the players have no action. In state 1, player I and player II can choose row 1, column 1 and player I can expect 3 + .5v 1 where v 1 is what God can get for him/her if He played from the beginning. If they choose row 1 and column 2, player I can expect 0 + 0.5.v 2 . Here v 1 and v 2 are the optimal value starting at states 1 and 2. Clearly v 2 = 0 and thus we are led to an auxiliary game with payoffs
Playing the original stochastic game optimally corresponds to playing this auxiliary game optimally. Shapley showed that this corresponds to solving the non-linear equation: v = (v 1 , v 2 ) where 
It can easily be shown that the above sequence of approximations converges to v(s), the unique fixed point of the non-linear functional equations:
Remark. While near-optimal stationary strategies can be derived from the above scheme when v n is sufficiently close to v, it should be noted that Shapley's algorithm does not utilize the information contained in the optimal strategies of A s (v n )'s at each iteration.
The literature on stochastic games now contains a number of iterative algorithms that attempt to improve on the preceding basic scheme of Shapley based on non-linear programming techniques [18] , [49] , [37] , [45] , [52] , [12] . Algorithm 2 (Hoffman and Karp [18] )
−
Step 1: Set v 0 (s) = 0 for each state s and τ = 0. − Step 2: Find an optimal strategy for player II in the matrix games A s (v τ ) for each state s. Let g τ +1 be one such optimal strategy. − Step 3: Solve the MDP (Markov Decision Process) problem v τ +1 = max f φ β (f, g τ +1 ). − Step 4: Put τ := τ + 1 and return to Step 2. It can be shown that v τ → v, the value vector of the stochastic game, as τ → ∞. Note that this algorithm iterates in both the value space and the strategy space. Since we are moving in both policy and value space, we use past information. The MDP can be solved by linear programming (see [22] ). Algorithm 3 (Pollatschek and Avi-Itzhak [37] )
to the value vector.
for optimal strategies f τ (s), g τ (s) for players I and II.
Step 4: Set τ := τ + 1 and return to Step 2.
Theorem 1 (Pollatschek and Avi-Itzhak [37] ) The above algorithm converges when There are other algorithms that use fictitious play [13] . They are known to be slow and we know that fictitious play is unsuitable even for ordinary bimatrix games [23] .
Orderfield Property
The data defining an n-person discounted stochastic game consists of immediate rewards, transition probabilities, and the discount factor. We say that the game has orderfield property if all the entries to at least one solution to the problem lie in the smallest ordered subfield F of reals that contains the data. Since all field elements are generated from the data by finite arithmetic operations, one hopes to solve such games by a finite arithmetic step algorithm. (See [13] .)
Even though many such subclasses of stochastic games do possess orderfield property (see [39] , pp. 446-447), we will concentrate on two special classes, namely single-controller stochastic games and perfect information stochastic games. These two classes have been studied extensively in both discounted and Cesaro average payoffs [35] , [51] , [20] , [43] , [33] , [32] , [41] , [16] , [26] , [7] , [27] , [53] , [40] .
Zero-Sum Two-Person Single-Controller Stochastic Games
Consider the following stochastic game with two states and with immediate rewards.
Here the transitions are controlled by player II, the column player. His choice of column determines the transitions. If player II chooses column 2 in state 1, the game moves to state 2. In state 2, if player II chooses column 3, the game moves to state 1. It was shown by Parthasarathy and Raghavan [35] that in this class of games and, more generally, when the transition probability q(t | s, i, j) is of the type q(t | s, j), the game has orderfield property in both discounted and Cesaro average payoffs. The game can easily be found by linear programming (LP). The reason is quite simple. With a discount β the two auxiliary games are given by
Every list of variables, (
consists of a list of optimal stationary strategies of player I and the values v 1 and v 2 of the discounted stochastic games. Therefore, the stationary optimal strategies of player I can be found among optimal solutions of the linear programming problem
In solving a discounted stochastic game, we can always assume that the immediate rewards are positive. Thus we can also assume that the above LP has an optimal solution v 1 , v 2 bounded by
where C is the maximum immediate payoff over all states. Indeed, the dual to the above LP can be used to construct an optimal stationary strategy {(y 1 , y 2 ), (η 1 , η 2 , η 3 )} for player II.
In general terms, the primal in player-II-control games is to find an optimal solution to the LP
The dual LP is given by
From the above we see that j y j (t) > 0 ∀ t, feasible{y j (s)}. Normalizing them will give a stationary strategy for player II. By complementary slackness we can conclude that for an optimal f • for player I, and the stationary g • induced by normalizing an optimal (y • (s), θ • (s)) of the dual, we get r(f, g • ) ≤ θ • (s)/ j y j (s) for all stationary f with equality at
Premultiplying by the nonnegative ma-
Thus g • is optimal for player II.
In a general two-person zero-sum stochastic game any optimal stationary strategy of player I will depend on the discount factor β. However, for every zero-sum two-person single-controller stochastic game there is a stationary strategy g • for player II (controlling player), which remains optimal for all β sufficiently close to 1. Such a strategy is called a uniform optimal strategy.
Example 2 Consider the stochastic game with two states given by
In the above stochastic game, player II has (
2 )) as the uniform optimal stationary strategy for all β close to 1. However, the unique optimal strategy for player I is f • (1) = (
Remark. Solving efficiently for the uniform optimal strategy for player II is still unresolved.
However, for undiscounted single-controller games with Cesaro average payoffs, just the existence of uniform optimal strategies for the controller helps one to solve the problem by a single linear program. This reduction is closely related to an algorithm by Hordijk and Kallenberg [19] for Markov decision processes which in turn is based on a sharp estimate of the Cesaro payoff for MDP via discounted payoff. Theorem 3 (Blackwell [3] ) Consider an MDP with rewards r(s, i), transitions p(t/s, i) where i ∈ A(s), the finite action space at state s. Given a stationary policy f , let Q(f ) be the Cesaro limit of the stationary transition matrix P (f ) = (p(t/s, f ). Then the discounted payoff φ β (f ) using f and the Cesaro payoff φ(f ) satisfies
One can exploit the above to develop an LP algorithm to solve for undiscounted single-controller games. Theorem 4 (Hordijk and Kallenberg [20] , Vrieze [51] ) Consider a player-II-control stochastic game. Then an optimal (f, φ, u) to the following dual linear programming problems can be used to find the value and optimal stationary strategies. Any optimal φ is the undiscounted value. Any optimal f is an optimal stationary strategy for player I. The LP and its dual are given by
At an optimal solution for the dual problems let j y j (t) = y . (t), j x j (t) = x . (t). From the above inequalities we have for each t either y . (t) > 0 or x . (t) > 0. We first normalize the vector (y 1 (t), y 2 (t), . . .) to get a mixed strategy for each state t. In case y . (t) = 0, we have x . (t) > 0. Normalizing the vector (x 1 (t), x 2 (t), . . .), we get a mixed strategy at state t. Such a choice gives an optimal stationary strategy g • for player II. Thus we can solve zero-sum single-controller undiscounted games by a single linear program.
Single-Controller Non-Zero-Sum Two-Person Stochastic Games
Fink [14] and independently Takahashi [47] first extended the theorem of Shapley for n-person non-zero-sum discounted stochastic games. They showed that stationary Nash equilibrium strategies exist for these games.
When the transition is controlled by a single player, Parthasarathy and Raghavan [35] showed that these games admit a Nash equilibrium in stationary strategies with orderfield property. They also showed that undiscounted single-controller stochastic games have stationary Nash equilibria and they too possess orderfield property.
Nowak and Raghavan [34] proved the following theorem which contains a recipe for a finite-step algorithm. 
Let (ξ * , η * ) be a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium point to the bimatrix game We will use an example from [34] to illustrate the above algorithm. The stochastic game has three states and each player has two actions at each state. Here the discount factor β = .8. We take the entries as immediate penalties. The players want to minimize their expected discounted penalties. .
There will be eight pure stationary strategies for each player that could be lexicographically enumerated as (111), (112) 
for s=3.
Remark. Even though the problem is reduced to solving for a Nash equilibrium point of a bimatrix game, the full enumeration of the entire matrix is undesirable. What is desirable is to solve the game via some pivoting algorithm.
Discounted Single-Controller Game via Lemke's LCP Algorithm
The linear complementarity problem can be stated as follows. Given a vector q ∈ R n and a matrix M ∈ R n×n , find a vector z such that:
The above system is usually denoted by LCP(q, M ). A pair (w, z) of vectors satisfying the above system of inequalities is called a solution to the LCP(q, M ). For the literature on Lemke's algorithm to solve LCP(q, M ) see [24] . For a recent book on the linear complementarity problem see [8] . It can be shown that the LCP is a generalization of the well-known LP (linear program). In the historic work of Lemke [24] , a simplex-like pivoting algorithm to process LCP's is given. Unfortunately, the algorithm does not always find a solution to a given LCP. There are, however, certain classes of matrices M for which Lemke's algorithm will process LCP(q, M ).
LCP for Discounted Single-Controller Games
For discounted non-zero-sum two-person games where player II alone controls the transitions, [32] gave one such linear complementarity reduction.
The following lemma facilitates such a reduction of the original problem to a linear complementarity problem. 
is also a stationary equilibrium for the single-controller stochastic game.
Proof. For a proof see Lemma 2.3 of [35] . Thus, solving single-controller games is reduced to solving for equilibria of the above games. We are ready to recast this problem as a linear complementarity problem. Theorem 6 The pairs (f • (s), g • (s)) and (v 1 (s), v 2 (s)) form Nash equilibrium strategies with corresponding equilibrium costs for players I and II iff they satisfy the following system of equations:
βq(t | s, j)φ β (t)+φ β (s) = 0 ∀ j, and ∀s (8)
where φ β (s) is the β-discounted equilibrium cost for player II. 
Lemke's algorithm when applied to the above LCP may terminate in a secondary ray. See [8] for its definitions and more details. However, adding the square matrix Λ with all entries unity to the immediate payoff part 0 −r 2 r 1 0
Mohan et al. [32] showed that the LCP(q,M ) belongs to class L of Eaves [9] , with the following property.
Theorem 7 LCP(d,M ) has a unique solution when
While for this class of matrices Lemke's algorithm with any positive covering vector will compute a unique solution to LCP(q,M ), in our case the q vector is not > 0. However, by Theorem 3.5 of Garcia [15] , Lemke's algorithm will process this LCP and hence compute a Nash equilibrium point to the auxiliary game. 
Non-Zero-Sum Undiscounted Single-Controller Stochastic Games
In this section we will consider player-II-control games and show that under the limiting average cost criterion, these games can also be solved by a single Lemke-processible LCP.
Consider the induced undiscounted MDP where player I fixes his strategy to a stationary strategy π. When player II chooses action b in state t, the immediate cost incurred is given by r 2 (t, b) = a∈A(t) π a (t)r 2 (t, a, b) . The transitions of the MDP are the same as those of the original game since π has no influence over them. Using the LP formulation for limiting average MDP's, player II's best reply to π comes as a solution to the following pair of dual LP's:
subject to (19) subject to b∈B(j)
In this setup we have y ib and x ib complementary to the slack variables of (16) and (17) respectively. Conversely, we have φ(j) and u(j) complementary slack variables to (20) and (21) respectively. Suppose we have an optimal solution for both programs, say (φ * , u * , x * , y * ). Then player II's optimal strategy ρ * (against π) would be extracted as follows.
One can verify, using (20) , that ρ * is well defined. Also we have φ * (i) = φ 2 (π, ρ * ). A key property of this pair of LP's is that those states i ∈ S for which c∈B(i) x * ic = 0 are transient in the Markov chain induced by ρ * . Next we make some adjustments to (19) - (22) so that they can be put into LCP form.
• Replace = 0 on the right-hand side of (21) by ≥ 0. This is still equivalent to the original LP.
• Tighten the constraints on u(i)'s. Namely, the u(i)'s can be restricted to being nonnegative. (Note that for any constant θ changing from u(i) to u(i) + θ, ∀ i leaves the objective function of primal LP unchanged.) The complementary slackness of the new (9.7) will be untouched.
• We can assume that all immediate costs are positive.
This has the effect that any optimal φ * > 0 in the primal LP. We can replace (20) by the weaker inequality s.t.
b∈B(j)
• One additional adjustment is to replace the right-hand side of (17) with
Its effect is to introduce complementary variables on the one side, while at an optimal solution all it does is to add 1 to all coordinates of an optimal φ.
Next we take care of the player I side with complementary inequalities. Consider the following set of inequalities:
along with the complementary conditions
We can normalizez ia 's to get a stationary strategyπ for player I if in the above equation we have a complementary solution with v(i) > 0 ∀i. This is easily achieved by replacing (25) and (28) with
We begin by writing equations and inequalities mnemonically where the last ones below are the complementarity conditions.
Let z = (π, y, x, φ, u, v). The above LCP can be written as w = M z + q where the matrix M is a partitioned matrix of the type
where the three-way split is partitioned as π|y|x for the rows of R as well as its columns. We define all entries of C ∞ and C ∈ to be equal to 1. The To complete the construction of the LCP we need to define the vector q. Like z, q is also an n × 1 vector. We set all the coordinates of q to 0 with the exception of the indices (u, v). Those coordinates of q in u will have value − 1 s . The coordinates in v will have value −1.
Lemma 2 Lemke's algorithm will provide a solution to LCP(q, M ).
Proof. It is easy to show show that LCP(q, M ) is feasible. Observe
It is easy to check that the matrix M is copositive plus, that is:
Thus by a theorem of Lemke [24] (see also [9] ), Lemke's algorithm will process the LCP and will terminate.
Indeed, the LCP solution vector z * = (π * , y * , x * , φ * , u * , v * ) supplies a stationary equilibrium strategy for the undiscounted single-controller stochastic games. We can use y * , x * to construct an equilibrium stationary strategy ρ * for player II. We can use π * to serve as the stationary equilibrium strategy for player I. We can use φ * − 1 to recover the equilibrium payoff to player II.
Discounted Stochastic Games of Perfect Information
Here we consider the special class of discounted stochastic games with perfect information. In perfect information games, at each state at most one player has more than one action to choose from his action set. If the player who has one action is the same one in all states then it is the classic Markovian Decision Process (MDP). One can solve the discounted MDP via Howard's policy improvement algorithm [21] . Our task here is to adapt the policy improvement algorithm of the discounted MDP to these games. The existence theorem for perfect information stochastic games imposes a strong combinatorial structure on them. This then serves as a motivation for our algorithm, which is an extension of the Howard-Blackwell [3] policy improvement algorithm for the discounted stochastic game.
Shapley [44] showed that under the discounted payoff criterion, perfect information stochastic games admit optimal pure stationary strategies, for both players. For a pair of pure stationary strategies (f, g) we define as usual φ β (f, g) to be the vector of expected discounted payoffs, resulting from f and g. For every pair t, s of states we denote by Q t,s (f, g) the probability of transition from state t to state s given the stationary strategies f of player 1 and g of player 2. Since the immediate transition probability Q t (f, g) = (Q t,s (f, g)) s∈S at each state t is determined by the action of at most one player for perfect information games, we can always write either Q t (f, g) = Q t (f ) or Q t (f, g) = Q t (g) as the case may be. In case it is a state with exactly one action for each player, the transitions are given a priori for nature and so in such states t we could even suppress the dependence of Q t on f or g. Likewise, we write r(f, g) to be the vector indexed by the state space whose t-th component is r (t, f (t), g(t) ). Just like Q(f, g), the coordinate r(t, f (t), g(t)) of r(f, g) does not depend on g (on f ) whenever player II (player I) has a single action in state t.
For the discounted MDP there is the policy improvement algorithm of Howard [21] , which can be used to determine optimal policies. This algorithm starts at an arbitrary policy f 0 and produces a sequence of improvements f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f k until an optimal policy is reached. In the sequence of policies the corresponding values φ β are strictly monotonic and therefore the algorithm must terminate (there are only a finite number of pure stationary policies). Extending the policy improvement algorithm of MDP's to stochastic games was initially attempted by Pollatschek and Avi-Itzhak [37] ; however, they were only able to prove that their algorithm terminates for games with a stringent condition on the transitions and the discount factor [51] , [49] .
We rearrange the states so that player I has more than one action and player II has exactly one action in states 1, . . . , t 1 and player I has exactly one action and player II has more than one action in states t 1 +1, . . . , t 1 +t 2 . The rest of the states can likewise be dubbed as states of nature. When a strategy of one player is fixed, we are in a discounted MDP and it is enough to find the best pure stationary strategy among all pure stationary strategies. For a pair of pure stationary strategies (f, g) we write [(f, g) = (f (1), g(1) ), . . . , (f (s), g(s)] where (f (t), g(t)) is the pair of actions chosen in state t under (f, g). For any state t at least one of f (t) or g(t) is 1. (The player is essentially a dummy for that state.) An adjacent improvement of type I is a new pair of pure stationary strategies (h, g) where:
1. h and f differ in exactly one state, namely there existst, 1 ≤t ≤ t 1 , with h(t) = f (t) and
The purpose of the second condition is clearly that player I is better off playing h than f against player II's g. The first condition is an adjacency condition required in our algorithm. It states that h differs from f in exactly one state. Of course we have the corresponding definition for adjacent improvement of type II, namely it is a pair (f, h) where:
Notice that in both cases we require a strict improvement in φ β value in some state. A pair of pure stationary strategies (f , g ) will be called an improvement of (f, g) if it is a strict but adjacent improvement of either type I or type II. Note that in such a case we would have either f = f or g = g depending on the type of improvement.
In our algorithm we start with a pair of pure stationary strategies and generate a sequence of improvements via lexicographic search. That is, we start in state 1 and proceed as follows. We always look for an adjacent improvement of type I for player I. If such an improvement doesn't exist then we search for an improvement of type II (of course, we will not find them in states where player II is a dummy). Now if neither exists then the search moves to state 2 and we repeat the procedure. After an improvement of either type is found, we move to the new pair and begin searching for improvements back from state 1 again. We will prove that such a procedure must terminate in an optimal pair (f * , g * ). Algorithm 4
1. Choose arbitrarily a pair of pure stationary strategies (f 0 , g 0 ) (e.g., f 0 (t) = g 0 (t) = 1 for t = 1, . . . , s) and set α = 0. 2. Search lexicographically for an improvement (f α+1 , g α+1 ) of (f α , g α ) always looking first for player I and then only for player II. There are three cases:
Case 1: An improvement f for player I is found. In this case let (f α+1 , g α+1 ) = (f, g α ) and α = α + 1, and repeat step 2. Case 2: There are no improvements for player I, but there is an improvement g for player II. In this case let (f α+1 , g α+1 ) = (f α , g) and α = α + 1, and repeat step 2. Case 3: There are no improvements. Go to step 3.
3. The pair (f * , g * ) = (f α , g α ) is an optimal pure stationary strategy pair for the two players.
Remark. The claim that a lexicographically locally optimal pair is optimal for the stochastic game does not follow directly from local optimality or from MDP. It depends on some intrinsic properties of stochastic games of perfect information and we develop them now.
Remark. In an ordinary matrix game A = (a ij ) with value v, if a pq = v, it does not mean p, q are good pure strategies.
Curiously, however, for the case of stochastic games with perfect information, we have the following. For what follows we require some notation. Let t ∈ S be a fixed state. For any X ⊂ A(t) we let Γ t X be the subgame in which only the actions in X are allowed in state t. The corresponding pure stationary strategy sets will be denoted by F t X and G t X . For the original game Γ we write F and G for the pure stationary strategy sets of players I and II respectively.
When one of the players, say player I, restricts his actions in state t to only those in the set X, while player II has no restrictions at all in any state, we reach the subgame Γ t X . The pure stationary strategy space G t X for player II for this subgame is the same as G in the original game because player II's strategy is not constrained. Remark. Unlike in the policy improvement algorithm of MDP, in our case we cannot expect any monotonicity property of the payoffs along the algorithmic path.
Lemma 4 For t ∈ S, X ⊂ A(t), Y ⊂ A(t), X
Proof. A proof can be given by an induction on the total number n of actions available for the two players in all states, that is, n = s i=1 (a i + b i ). For details see [41] .
Undiscounted Simple Stochastic Games
From the point of view of complexity theory, perfect information stochastic games in undiscounted and total payoffs have been of interest to computer scientists [7] , [17] , [27] , [28] , [53] .
Condon [7] studied the so-called simple stochastic games (SSG). These are special classes of stochastic games called recursive games of perfect information [10] . In recursive games the immediate payoff is 0 at all nonabsorbing states. In simple stochastic games, one further assumes that the immediate payoff is 1 just at one absorbing state called the I-sink and the immediate payoff is 0 at exactly one absorbing state called the II-sink. Depending on the maximizer, or minimizer, or nature (who has two actions in that state), they are called max, min and average states. In average states a coin is tossed to choose one of two available actions. The maximizer prefers the game to get absorbed into I-sink. The minimizer prefers the game to get absorbed into II-sink. Also in these games, the law of motion is exact, in the sense that from, say, a max state, depending on the action of the player, the game moves to another state in unit time with probability 1.
Condon gives a polynomial time value iteration algorithm when the game has exact law of motion and there are no average states. The algorithm is quite simple and intuitive. If from any max state t there is an action taking the game to a state with value 1, we define the value at state t as v(t) = 1. If all actions at a max state end in a state with value 0, we define v(t) = 0. Similar definitions apply at min states. If from an average state τ one reaches the two states t or t with values v(t), v(t ) respectively, the value satisfies v(τ ) = 1 2 v(t) + 1 2 v(t ). Since the value is known at the two sinks, the value is determined at all other states by backward induction. She also presents an algorithm for the case when the game terminates with probability one into one of the two sinks. For simple stochastic games a policy iteration-type algorithm is given by Ludwig [27] . He also assumes that for every strategy pair the termination occurs with probability 1 in one of the two sinks. Ludwig's algorithm can be described as follows.
Remark. Switching control games are still open for efficient algorithms even for discounted or undiscounted zero-sum games.
